Abstract. It's an important research issue in a remote user authentication scheme for a multi-server environment. Recently, Li et al. proposed a scheme to remedy Lee et al.'s scheme to avoid the forgery attack, server spoofing attack and changing password easily. However, we find that Li et al.'s scheme is insecure against a server spoofing attack.
Introduction
In the information explosion age, the Internet has been a part of our life. We can do a lot of things through the Internet, like online-shopping, E-banking and online game etc. If we want to use the different services, we must register the different service servers provided. And then we must remember many pairs of ID and password. In order to solve this problem and make users convenient, Li et al. [6] proposed a remote password authentication scheme for a multi-server architecture using neural networks in 2001. The user only registers the registration center once and memorizes a pair of ID and password, and the user will get provided services. There are many related works with multi-servers [1, 2, 4, 10, 13, 14] . However, using static ID has the security weakness.
Therefore, in 2009, Liao et al. [11] proposed a secure dynamic ID based on a remote user authentication scheme for a multi-server environment. In 2009, Hsiang et al. [3] pointed that Liao et al.'s [9] scheme is still vulnerable to insider's attacks, masquerade attacks, and server spoofing attacks, so the scheme does not achieve mutual authentication. Therefore, Hsiang et al. [3] improved the scheme to remedy security holes. But in 2011, Sood et al. [12] and Lee et al. [5] respectively proved that Hsiang et al.'s [3] scheme was still vulnerable. Sood et al. [12] proposed an improved scheme that authenticates the user identity through a registration center. And Li et al. [8] and Xue et al. [16] keep going on researching into verifying by a registration center. On the contrary, Lee et al.'s [5] scheme verifies the user identity relying on a service server. In 2013, Li et al. [7] remedied Lee et al.'s scheme to avoid the forgery attack, server spoofing attack and changing password easily.
In this paper, we prove that Li et al.'s scheme is insecure against a server spoofing attack. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the Li et al.'s scheme. In Section 3, we show how to attack Li et al.'s scheme. Finally, we make a conclusion in Section 4.
Review of Li et al.'s Scheme
In Table 1 , we show the notations' meaning. There are four phases in Li's scheme [7] : registration phase, login phase, verification phase, and password change phase. We show these phase in Fig. 1 . The following is the detailed description of each phase. In this phase, all sessions go through the secure channel. Firstly, chooses the secret key x and the secret number y.
computes h(x||y) and h(SID j ||h(y)), and share them with S j . At the user part, it is as follows:
Step 1. chooses and , and computes = ℎ( ⊕ ) by using a random number .
sends { , } to .
① Inserts the smart card and inputs , Step 3.
sends { , , , ℎ(•), ℎ( )} to .
Step 4. The smart card stores the following parameters: { , , , , ℎ(•), ℎ( )}.
Login phase:
Step 1. inserts the smart card and inputs and . The smart card computes = ℎ( ⊕ ), * = ℎ( ‖ℎ( )‖ ) . And then checks if * equals . If no, the smart card denies the login request. Otherwise, it will continue the following steps.
Step 2. The smart card generates a nonce , and computes
sends the login request � , , 1 , 2 � to .
Verification phase:
Step 1. uses the login information and a known value to compute
computes ℎ� ‖ ‖ ‖ �, and checks whetherit is equals 1 , If it is not equal, rejects the login request and stops this session. If yes, the following steps are continued.
Step 3.
generates a nonce and computes
sends { 3 , 4 } to Step 5. computes = ⊕ ⊕ 4 , and checks ℎ� � � � � if it is equal 3 . If it is equal, computes 5 = ℎ� � � � � and sends { 5 } to . Otherwise, the communication is rejected and stoped.
Step 6.
computes ℎ� � � � � and checks the received message { 5 } . After successful mutual authentication, and commonly negotiate a session key = ℎ� ‖ � � � � for the future secure session.
Change password phase:
Step 1. inserts the smart card and inputs and . The smart card computes = ℎ( ⊕ ), * = ℎ( ‖ℎ( )‖ ) and checks if * equals .
Step 2. If equal, chooses the new password , and the smart card generates new random value . The smart card computes = ℎ( ⊕ ), = ℎ( ‖ℎ( )‖ ).
Step 3. The smart card replaces the stored information with .
Attack on Li et al.'s Scheme
At first, we assume that the attacker is a legal user and the legal providing service server, too. Secondly, the attacker can extract the stored information { , , , , ℎ(•), ℎ( )} in the smart card. We give the attacker the notation . And then we show how to masquerade server .
Step 1. is a legal user, so extracts ℎ( ) from his/her smart card. And uses public to compute ℎ� ‖ℎ( )�.
Step 2. Because is a legal server, also knows ℎ( ‖ ).
intercepts 's login request message to , so can achieve mutual authentication with and successfully establish communication.
Therefore, can masquerade other providing service server. Li et al.'s scheme thus cannot resist a server spoofing attack.
Conclusion
In this paper we show that Li et al.'s scheme is not secure. Li et al.'s scheme cannot resist a legal server to masquerade another server. Therefore, we can research how to remedy Li et al.'s the scheme in the future.
